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Abstract
Digital media enables not only fast sharing
of information, but also disinformation. One
prominent case of an event leading to circu-
lation of disinformation on social media is
the MH17 plane crash. Studies analysing the
spread of information about this event on Twit-
ter have focused on small, manually anno-
tated datasets, or used proxys for data anno-
tation. In this work, we examine to what ex-
tent text classifiers can be used to label data
for subsequent content analysis, in particular
we focus on predicting pro-Russian and pro-
Ukrainian Twitter content related to the MH17
plane crash. Even though we find that a neural
classifier improves over a hashtag based base-
line, labeling pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian
content with high precision remains a chal-
lenging problem. We provide an error analysis
underlining the difficulty of the task and iden-
tify factors that might help improve classifica-
tion in future work. Finally, we show how the
classifier can facilitate the annotation task for
human annotators.
1 Introduction
Digital media enables fast sharing of information,
including various forms of false or deceptive in-
formation. Hence, besides bringing the obvious
advantage of broadening information access for
everyone, digital media can also be misused for
campaigns that spread disinformation about spe-
cific events, or campaigns that are targeted at spe-
cific individuals or governments. Disinformation,
in this case, refers to intentionally misleading con-
tent (Fallis, 2015).
A prominent case of a disinformation campaign
are the efforts of the Russian government to con-
trol information during the Russia-Ukraine crisis
(Pomerantsev and Weiss, 2014). One of the most
important events during the crisis was the crash
of Malaysian Airlines (MH17) flight on July 17,
2014. The plane crashed on its way from Ams-
terdam to Kuala Lumpur over Ukrainian territory,
causing the death of 298 civilians. The event im-
mediately led to the circulation of competing nar-
ratives about who was responsible for the crash
(see Section 2), with the two most prominent nar-
ratives being that the plane was either shot down
by the Ukrainian military, or by Russian sepa-
ratists in Ukraine supported by the Russian gov-
ernment (Oates, 2016). The latter theory was con-
firmed by findings of an international investigation
team. In this work, information that opposes these
findings by promoting other theories about the
crash is considered disinformation. When study-
ing disinformation, however, it is important to ac-
knowledge that our fact checkers (in this case the
international investigation team) may be wrong,
which is why we focus on both of the narratives
in our study.
MH17 is a highly important case in the con-
text of international relations, because the tragedy
has not only increased Western, political pressure
against Russia, but may also continue putting the
government’s global image at stake. In 2020, at
least four individuals connected to the Russian
separatist movement will face murder charges for
their involvement in the MH17 crash (Harding,
2019), which is why one can expect the waves
of disinformation about MH17 to continue spread-
ing. The purpose of this work is to develop an ap-
proach that may help both practitioners and schol-
ars of political science, international relations and
political communication to detect and measure the
scope of MH17-related disinformation.
Several studies analyse the framing of the crash
and the spread of (dis)information about the event
in terms of pro-Russian or pro-Ukrainian fram-
ing. These studies analyse information based
on manually labeled content, such as television
transcripts (Oates, 2016) or tweets (Golovchenko
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et al., 2018; Hjorth and Adler-Nissen, 2019). Re-
stricting the analysis to manually labeled content
ensures a high quality of annotations, but prohibits
analysis from being extended to the full amount
of available data. Another widely used method
for classifying misleading content is to use dis-
tant annotations, for example to classify a tweet
based on the domain of a URL that is shared
by the tweet, or a hashtag that is contained in
the tweet (Guess et al., 2019; Gallacher et al.,
2018; Grinberg et al., 2019). Often, this approach
treats content from uncredible sources as mislead-
ing (e.g. misinformation, disinformation or fake
news). This methods enables researchers to scale
up the number of observations without having to
evaluate the fact value of each piece of content
from low-quality sources. However, the approach
fails to address an important issue: Not all content
from uncredible sources is necessarily misleading
or false and not all content from credible sources is
true. As often emphasized in the propaganda liter-
ature, established media outlets too are vulnerable
to state-driven disinformation campaigns, even if
they are regarded as credible sources (Jowett and
O’donnell, 2014; Taylor, 2003; Chomsky and Her-
man, 1988)1.
In order to scale annotations that go beyond
metadata to larger datasets, Natural Language Pro-
cessing (NLP) models can be used to automat-
ically label text content. For example, several
works developed classifiers for annotating text
content with frame labels that can subsequently
be used for large-scale content analysis (Boydstun
et al., 2014; Tsur et al., 2015; Card et al., 2015;
Johnson et al., 2017; Ji and Smith, 2017; Naderi
and Hirst, 2017; Field et al., 2018; Hartmann et al.,
2019). Similarly, automatically labeling attitudes
expressed in text (Walker et al., 2012; Hasan and
Ng, 2013; Augenstein et al., 2016; Zubiaga et al.,
2018) can aid the analysis of disinformation and
misinformation spread (Zubiaga et al., 2016). In
this work, we examine to which extent such clas-
sifiers can be used to detect pro-Russian framing
related to the MH17 crash, and to which extent
classifier predictions can be relied on for analysing
information flow on Twitter.
1The U.S. media coverage of weapons of mass destruc-
tion in Iraq stands as one of the most prominent examples
of how generally credible sources can be exploited by state
authorities.
MH17 Related (Dis-)Information Flow on Twit-
ter We focus our classification efforts on a
Twitter dataset introduced in Golovchenko et al.
(2018), that was collected to investigate the flow of
MH17-related information on Twitter, focusing on
the question who is distributing (dis-)information.
In their analysis, the authors found that citizens are
active distributors, which contradicts the widely
adopted view that the information campaign is
only driven by the state and that citizens do not
have an active role.
To arrive at this conclusion, the authors manu-
ally labeled a subset of the tweets in the dataset
with pro-Russian/pro-Ukrainian frames and build
a retweet network, which has Twitter users as
nodes and edges between two nodes if a retweet
occurred between the two associated users. An
edge was considered as polarized (either pro-
Russian or pro-Ukrainian), if at least one retweet
between the two users connected by the edge was
pro-Russian/pro-Ukrainian. Then, the amount of
polarized edges between users with different pro-
files (e.g. citizen, journalist, state organ) was com-
puted.
Labeling more data via automatic classifica-
tion (or computer-assisted annotation) of tweets
could serve an analysis as the one presented in
Golovchenko et al. (2018) in two ways. First,
more edges could be labeled.2 Second, edges
could be labeled with higher precision, i.e. by
taking more tweets comprised by the edge into
account. For example, one could decide to
only label an edge as polarized if at least half
of the retweets between the users were pro-
Ukrainian/pro-Russian.
Contributions We evaluate different classifiers
that predict frames for unlabeled tweets in
Golovchenko et al. (2018)’s dataset, in order to
increase the number of polarized edges in the
retweet network derived from the data. This is
challenging due to a skewed data distribution and
the small amount of training data for the pro-
Russian class. We try to combat the data sparsity
using a data augmentation approach, but have to
report a negative result as we find that data aug-
mentation in this particular case does not improve
classification results. While our best neural classi-
fier clearly outperforms a hashtag-based baseline,
generating high quality predictions for the pro-
2Only 26% of the available tweets in Golovchenko et al.
(2018)’s dataset are manually labeled.
Russian class is difficult: In order to make predic-
tions at a precision level of 80%, recall has to be
decreased to 23%. Finally, we examine the appli-
cability of the classifier for finding new polarized
edges in a retweet network and show how, with
manual filtering, the number of pro-Russian edges
can be increased by 29%. We make our code,
trained models and predictions publicly available3.
2 Competing Narratives about the MH17
Crash
We briefly summarize the timeline around the
crash of MH17 and some of the dominant narra-
tives present in the dataset. On July 17, 2014,
the MH17 flight crashed over Donetsk Oblast in
Ukraine. The region was at that time part of
an armed conflict between pro-Russian separatists
and the Ukrainian military, one of the unrests fol-
lowing the Ukrainian revolution and the annexa-
tion of Crimea by the Russian government. The
territory in which the plane fell down was con-
trolled by pro-Russian separatists.
Right after the crash, two main narratives
were propagated: Western media claimed that
the plane was shot down by pro-Russian sepa-
ratists, whereas the Russian government claimed
that the Ukrainian military was responsible. Two
organisations were tasked with investigating the
causes of the crash, the Dutch Safety Board
(DSB) and the Dutch-led joint investigation team
(JIT). Their final reports were released in Octo-
ber 2015 and September 2016, respectively, and
conclude that the plane had been shot down by
a missile launched by a BUK surface-to-air sys-
tem. The BUK was stationed in an area con-
trolled by pro-Russian separatists when the mis-
sile was launched, and had been transported there
from Russia and returned to Russia after the inci-
dent. These findings are denied by the Russian
government until now. There are several other
crash-related reports that are frequently mentioned
throughout the dataset. One is a report by Almaz-
Antey, the Russian company that manufactured
the BUK, which rejects the DSB findings based on
mismatch of technical evidence. Several reports
backing up the Dutch findings were released by
the investigative journalism website Bellingcat.4
The crash also sparked the circulation of sev-
eral alternative theories, many of them promoted
3https://github.com/coastalcph/mh17
4https://www.bellingcat.com/
in Russian media (Oates, 2016), e.g. that the plane
was downed by Ukrainian SU25 military jets, that
the plane attack was meant to hit Putin’s plane that
was allegedly traveling the same route earlier that
day, and that the bodies found in the plane had al-
ready been dead before the crash.
3 Dataset
For our classification experiments, we use the
MH17 Twitter dataset introduced by Golovchenko
et al. (2018), a dataset collected in order to study
the flow of (dis)information about the MH17 plane
crash on Twitter. It contains tweets collected based
on keyword search5 that were posted between July
17, 2014 (the day of the plane crash) and Decem-
ber 9, 2016.
Golovchenko et al. (2018) provide annotations
for a subset of the English tweets contained in the
dataset. A tweet is annotated with one of three
classes that indicate the framing of the tweet with
respect to responsibility for the plane crash. A
tweet can either be pro-Russian (Ukrainian au-
thorities, NATO or EU countries are explicitly
or implicitly held responsible, or the tweet states
that Russia is not responsible), pro-Ukrainian
(the Russian Federation or Russian separatists in
Ukraine are explicitly or implicitly held responsi-
ble, or the tweet states that Ukraine is not respon-
sible) or neutral (neither Ukraine nor Russia or
any others are blamed). Example tweets for each
category can be found in Table 2. These exam-
ples illustrate that the framing annotations do not
reflect general polarity, but polarity with respect
to responsibility to the crash. For example, even
though the last example in the table is in general
pro-Ukrainian, as it displays the separatists in a
bad light, the tweet does not focus on responsibil-
ity for the crash. Hence the it is labeled as neutral.
Table 1 shows the label distribution of the anno-
tated portion of the data as well as the total amount
of original tweets, and original tweets plus their
retweets/duplicates in the network. A retweet is a
repost of another user’s original tweet, indicated
by a specific syntax (RT @username: ). We con-
sider as duplicate a tweet with text that is iden-
tical to an original tweet after preprocessing (see
Section 5.1). For our classification experiments,
5These keywords were: MH17, Malazijskij [and] Boeing
(in Russian), #MH17, #Pray4MH17, #PrayforMH17. The
dataset was collected using the Twitter Garden hose, which
means that it contains a 10% of all tweets within the specified
period that matched the search criterion.
Label Original All
Labeled
Pro-Russian 512 4,829
Pro-Ukrainian 910 12,343
Neutral 6,923 118,196
Unlabeled - 192,003 377,679
Total - 200,348 513,047
Table 1: Label distribution and dataset sizes. Tweets
are considered original if their preprocessed text is
unique. All tweets comprise original tweets, retweets
and duplicates.
we exclusively consider original tweets, but model
predictions can then be propagated to retweets and
duplicates.
4 Classification Models
For our classification experiments, we compare
three classifiers, a hashtag-based baseline, a logis-
tic regression classifier and a convolutional neural
network (CNN).
Hashtag-Based Baseline Hashtags are often
used as a means to assess the content of a tweet
(Efron, 2010; Godin et al., 2013; Dhingra et al.,
2016). We identify hashtags indicative of a class
in the annotated dataset using the pointwise mu-
tual information (pmi) between a hashtag hs and a
class c, which is defined as
pmi(hs, c) = log
p(hs, c)
p(hs) p(c)
(1)
We then predict the class for unseen tweets as the
class that has the highest pmi score for the hash-
tags contained in the tweet. Tweets without hash-
tag (5% of the tweets in the development set) or
with multiple hashtags leading to conflicting pre-
dictions (5% of the tweets in the development set)
are labeled randomly. We refer to to this baseline
as HS_PMI.
Logistic Regression Classifier As non-neural
baseline we use a logistic regression model.6 We
compute input representations for tweets as the av-
erage over pre-trained word embedding vectors for
all words in the tweet. We use fasttext embeddings
(Bojanowski et al., 2017) that were pre-trained on
Wikipedia.7
6As non-neural alternative, we also experimented with
SVMs. These showed inferior performance to the regression
model.
7In particular, with cross-lingual experiments in mind
(see Section 7), we used embeddings that are pre-aligned
Convolutional Neural Network Classifier As
neural classification model, we use a convolutional
neural network (CNN) (Kim, 2014), which has
previously shown good results for tweet classifi-
cation (dos Santos and Gatti, 2014; Dhingra et al.,
2016).8 The model performs 1d convolutions over
a sequence of word embeddings. We use the same
pre-trained fasttext embeddings as for the logistic
regression model. We use a model with one con-
volutional layer and a relu activation function, and
one max pooling layer. The number of filters is
100 and the filter size is set to 4.
5 Experimental Setup
We evaluate the classification models using 10-
fold cross validation, i.e. we produce 10 different
datasplits by randomly sampling 60% of the data
for training, 20% for development and 20% for
testing. For each fold, we train each of the models
described in Section 4 on the training set and mea-
sure performance on the test set. For the CNN and
LOGREG models, we upsample the training exam-
ples such that each class has as many instances
as the largest class (Neutral). The final reported
scores are averages over the 10 splits.9
5.1 Tweet Preprocessing
Before embedding the tweets, we replace urls,
retweet syntax (RT @user_name: ) and @men-
tions (@user_name) by placeholders. We low-
ercase all text and tokenize sentences using the
StandfordNLP pipeline (Qi et al., 2018). If a
tweet contains multiple sentences, these are con-
catenated. Finally, we remove all tokens that con-
tain non-alphanumeric symbols (except for dashes
and hashtags) and strip the hashtags from each to-
ken, in order to increase the number of words that
are represented by a pre-trained word embedding.
5.2 Evaluation Metrics
We report performance as F1-scores, which is the
harmonic mean between precision and recall. As
the class distribution is highly skewed and we
between languages available here https://fasttext.
cc/docs/en/aligned-vectors.html
8We also ran intitial experiments with recurrent neural
networks (RNNs), but found that results were comparable
with those achieved by the CNN architecture, which runs
considerably faster.
9We train with the same hyperparameters on all splits,
these hyperparameters were chosen according to the best
macro f score averaged over 3 runs with different random
seeds on one of the splits.
Label Example tweet
Pro-Ukrainian
Video - Missile that downed MH17 ’was brought in from Russia’ @peterlane5news
RT @mashable: Ukraine: Audio recordings show pro-Russian rebels tried to hide #MH17 black boxes.
Russia Calls For New Probe Into MH17 Crash. Russia needs to say, ok we fucked up.. Rather than play games
@IamMH17 STOP LYING! You have ZERO PROOF to falsely blame UKR for #MH17 atrocity. You will need to apologize.
Pro-Russian
Why the USA and Ukraine, NOT Russia, were probably behind the shooting down of flight #MH17
RT @Bayard_1967: UKRAINE Eyewitness Confirm Military Jet Flew Besides MH17 Airliner: BBC ...
RT @GrahamWP_UK: Just read through #MH17 @bellingcat report, what to say - written by frauds, believed by the gullible. Just that.
Neutral
#PrayForMH17 :(
RT @deserto_fox: Russian terrorist stole wedding ring from dead passenger #MH17
Table 2: Example tweets for each of the three classes.
are mainly interested in accurately classifying the
classes with low support (pro-Russian and pro-
Ukrainian), we report macro-averages over the
classes. In addition to F1-scores, we report the
area under the precision-recall curve (AUC).10 We
compute an AUC score for each class by convert-
ing the classification task into a one-vs-all classi-
fication task.
6 Results
The results of our classification experiments are
presented in Table 3. Figure 1 shows the per-class
precision-recall curves for the LOGREG and CNN
models as well as the confusion matrices between
classes.11
Comparison Between Models We observe that
the hashtag baseline performs poorly and does not
improve over the random baseline. The CNN
classifier outperforms the baselines as well as the
LOGREG model. It shows the highest improve-
ment over the LOGREG for the pro-Russian class.
Looking at the confusion matrices, we observe
that for the LOGREG model, the fraction of True
Positives is equal between the pro-Russian and the
pro-Ukrainian class. The CNN model produces a
higher amount of correct predictions for the pro-
Ukrainian than for the pro-Russian class. The
absolute number of pro-Russian True Positives is
lower for the CNN, but so is in return the amount
of misclassifications between the pro-Russian and
pro-Ukrainian class.
Per-Class Performance With respect to the per
class performance, we observe a similar trend
across models, which is that the models perform
10The AUC is computed according to the trapezoidal rule,
as implemented in the sklearn package (Pedregosa et al.,
2011)
11Both the precision-recall curves and the confusion ma-
trices were computed by concatenating the test sets of all 10
datasplits
best for the neutral class, whereas performance
is lower for the pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian
classes. All models perform worst on the pro-
Russian class, which might be due to the fact that it
is the class with the fewest instances in the dataset.
Considering these results, we conclude that the
CNN is the best performing model and also the
classifier that best serves our goals, as we want to
produce accurate predictions for the pro-Russian
and pro-Ukrainian class without confusing be-
tween them. Even though the CNN can im-
prove over the other models, the classification per-
formance for the pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian
class is rather low. One obvious reason for this
might be the small amount of training data, in par-
ticular for the pro-Russian class.
In the following, we briefly report a negative re-
sult on an attempt to combat the data sparseness
with cross-lingual transfer. We then perform an
error analysis on the CNN classifications to shed
light on the difficulties of the task.
7 Data Augmentation Experiments using
Cross-Lingual Transfer
The annotations in the MH17 dataset are highly
imbalanced, with as few as 512 annotated exam-
ples for the pro-Russian class. As the annotated
examples were sampled from the dataset at ran-
dom, we assume that there are only few tweets
with pro-Russian stance in the dataset. This ob-
servation is in line with studies that showed that
the amount of disinformation on Twitter is in fact
small (Guess et al., 2019; Grinberg et al., 2019). In
order to find more pro-Russian training examples,
we turn to a resource that we expect to contain
large amounts of pro-Russian (dis)information.
The Elections integrity dataset12 was released by
Twitter in 2018 and contains the tweets and ac-
12https://about.twitter.com/en_us/
values/elections-integrity.html#data
Macro-avg Pro-Russian Pro-Ukrainian Neutral
Model F1 AUC F1 AUC F1 AUC F1 AUC
RANDOM 0.25 - 0.10 - 0.16 - 0.47 -
HS_PMI 0.25 - 0.10 - 0.16 - 0.48 -
LOGREG 0.59 0.53 0.38 0.34 0.51 0.41 0.88 0.86
CNN 0.69 0.71 0.55 0.57 0.59 0.60 0.93 0.94
Table 3: Classification results on the English MH17 dataset measured as F1 and area under the precision-recall
curve (AUC).
count information for 3,841 accounts that are be-
lieved to be Russian trolls financed by the Russian
government. While most tweets posted after late
2014 are in English language and focus on topics
around the US elections, the earlier tweets in the
dataset are primarily in Russian language and fo-
cus on the Ukraine crisis (Howard et al., 2018).
One feature of the dataset observed by Howard
et al. (2018) is that several hashtags show high
peakedness (Kelly et al., 2012), i.e. they are posted
with high frequency but only during short inter-
vals, while others are persistent during time.
We find two hashtags in the Elections integrity
dataset with high peakedness that were exclusively
posted within 2 days after the MH17 crash and
that seem to be pro-Russian in the context of re-
sponsibility for the MH17 crash: #КиевСка-
жиПравду (Kiew tell the truth) and #Киев-
сбилбоинг (Kiew made the plane go down). We
collect all tweets with these two hashtags, result-
ing in 9,809 Russian tweets that we try to use as
additional training data for the pro-Russian class
in the MH17 dataset. We experiment with cross-
lingual transfer by embedding tweets via aligned
English and Russian word embeddings.13 How-
ever, so far results for the cross-lingual models do
not improve over the CNN model trained on only
English data. This might be due to the fact that the
additional Russian tweets rather contain a general
pro-Russian frame than specifically talking about
the crash, but needs further investigation.
8 Error Analysis
In order to integrate automatically labeled exam-
ples into a network analysis that studies the flow
of polarized information in the network, we need
to produce high precision predictions for the pro-
13We use two sets of monolingual fasttext embeddings
trained on Wikipedia (Bojanowski et al., 2017) that were
aligned relying on a seed lexicon of 5000 words via the RC-
SLS method (Joulin et al., 2018)
Russian and the pro-Ukrainian class. Polarized
tweets that are incorrectly classified as neutral will
hurt an analysis much less than neutral tweets that
are erroneously classified as pro-Russian or pro-
Ukrainian. However, the worst type of confu-
sion is between the pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian
class. In order to gain insights into why these
confusions happen, we manually inspect incor-
rectly predicted examples that are confused be-
tween the pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian class.
We analyse the misclassifications in the develop-
ment set of all 10 runs, which results in 73 False
Positives of pro-Ukrainian tweets being classified
as pro-Russian (referred to as pro-Russian False
Positives), and 88 False Positives of pro-Russian
tweets being classified as pro-Ukrainian (referred
to as pro-Ukrainian False Positives). We can iden-
tify three main cases for which the model produces
an error:
1. the correct class can be directly inferred from
the text content easily, even without back-
ground knowledge
2. the correct class can be inferred from the text
content, given that event-specific knowledge
is provided
3. the correct class can be inferred from the text
content if the text is interpreted correctly
For the pro-Russian False Positives, we find that
42% of the errors are category I and II errors, re-
spectively, and 15% of category III. For the pro-
Ukrainian False Positives, we find 48% category I
errors, 33% category II errors and and 13% cate-
gory III errors. Table 4 presents examples for each
of the error categories in both sets which we will
discuss in the following.
Category I Errors Category I errors could eas-
ily be classified by humans following the annota-
tion guidelines (see Section 3). One difficulty can
Figure 1: Confusion matrices for the CNN (left) and the logistic regression model (right). The y-axis shows the
true label while the x-axis shows the model prediction.
be seen in example f). Even though no background
knowledge is needed to interpret the content, in-
terpretation is difficult because of the convoluted
syntax of the tweet. For the other examples it
is unclear why the model would have difficulties
with classifying them.
Category II Errors Category II errors can
only be classified with event-specific background
knowledge. Examples g), i) and k) relate to the
theory that a Ukrainian SU25 fighter jet shot down
the plane in air. Correct interpretation of these
tweets depends on knowledge about the SU25
fighter jet. In order to correctly interpret exam-
ple j) as pro-Russian, it has to be known that the
bellingcat report is pro-Ukrainian. Example l) re-
lates to the theory that the shoot down was a false
flag operation run by Western countries and the
bodies in the plane were already dead before the
crash. In order to correctly interpret example m),
the identity of Kolomoisky has to be known. He is
an anti-separatist Ukrainian billionaire, hence his
involvement points to the Ukrainian government
being responsible for the crash.
Category III Errors Category III errors occur
for examples that can only be classified by cor-
rectly interpreting the tweet authors’ intention. In-
terpretation is difficult due to phenomena such as
irony as in examples n) and o). While the irony
is indicated in example n) through the use of the
hashtag #LOL, there is no explicit indication in ex-
ample o).
Interpretation of example q) is conditioned on
world knowledge as well as the understanding of
the speakers beliefs. Example r) is pro-Russian as
it questions the validity of the assumption AC360
is making, but we only know that because we
Error
cat.
True
class
Model
prediction
id Tweet
I
Pro-U Pro-R
a) RT @ChadPergram: Hill intel sources say Russia has the capability to potentially shoot down a
#MH17 but not Ukraine.
b) RT @C4ADS: .@bellingcat’s new report says #Russia used fake evidence for #MH17 case to
blame #Ukraine URL
c) The international investigation blames Russia for MH17 crash URL #KievReporter #MH17 #Rus-
sia #terror #Ukraine #news #war
Pro-R Pro-U
d) RT @RT_com: BREAKING: No evidence of direct Russian link to #MH17 - US URL URL
e) RT @truthhonour: Yes Washington was behind Eukraine jets that shot down MH17 as pretext to
conflict with Russia. No secrets there
f) Ukraine Media Falsely Claim Dutch Prosecutors Accuse Russia of Downing MH17: Dutch pros-
ecutors de URL #MH17 #alert
II
Pro-U Pro-R
g) @Werteverwalter @Ian56789 @ClarkeMicah no SU-25 re #MH17 believer has ever been able to
explain it,facts always get in their way
h) Rebel theories on #MH17 "total nonsense", Ukrainian Amb to U.S. Olexander Motsyk interviewed
by @jaketapper via @cnn
i) Ukrainian Pres. says it’s false "@cnnbrk: Russia says records indicate Ukrainian warplane was
flying within 5 km of #MH17 on day of crash.
Pro-R Pro-U
j) Russia has released some solid evidence to contradict @EliotHiggins + @bellingcat’s #MH17
report. http://t.co/3leYfSoLJ3
k) RT @masamikuramoto: @MJoyce2244 The jets were seen by Russian military radar and
Ukrainian eyewitnesses. #MH17 @Fossibilities @irina
l) RT @katehodal: Pro-Russia separatist says #MH17 bodies "weren’t fresh" when found in Ukraine
field,suggesting already dead b4takeoff
m) RT @NinaByzantina: #MH17 redux: 1) #Kolomoisky admits involvement URL 2) gets $1.8B of
#Ukraine’s bailout funds
III
Pro-U Pro-R
n) #Russia again claiming that #MH17 was shot down by air-to-air missile, which of course wasn’t
russian-made. #LOL URL
o) RT @20committee: New Moscow line is #MH17 was shot down by a Ukrainian fighter. With an
LGBT pilot, no doubt.
Pro-R Pro-U
q) RT @merahza: If you believe the pro Russia rebels shot #MH17 then you’ll believe Justine Bieber
is the next US President and that Coke is a
q) So what @AC360 is implying is that #US imposed sanctions on #Russia, so in turn they shot down
a #Malaysia jet carrying #Dutch people? #MH17
r) RT @GrahamWP_UK: #MH17 1. A man on sofa watching YouTube thinks it was a ’separatist
BUK’. 2. Man on site for over 25 hours doesn’t.
Table 4: Examples for the different error categories. Error category I are cases where the correct class can easily
be inferred from the text. For error category II, the correct class can be inferred from the text with event-specific
knowledge. For error category III, it is necessary to resolve humour/satire in order to infer the intended meaning
that the speaker wants to communicate.
know that the assumption is absurd. Example s)
requires to evaluate that the speaker thinks people
on site are trusted more than people at home.
From the error analysis, we conclude that cat-
egory I errors need further investigation, as here
the model makes mistakes on seemingly easy in-
stances. This might be due to the model not be-
ing able to correctly represent Twitter specific lan-
guage or unknown words, such as Eukraine in ex-
ample e). Category II and III errors are harder to
avoid and could be improved by applying reason-
ing (Wang and Cohen, 2015) or irony detection
methods (Van Hee et al., 2018).
9 Integrating Automatic Predictions into
the Retweet Network
Finally, we apply the CNN classifier to label new
edges in Golovchenko et al. (2018)’s retweet net-
work, which is shown in Figure 2. The retweet
network is a graph that contains users as nodes and
an edge between two users if the users are retweet-
ing each other.14 In order to track the flow of
polarized information, Golovchenko et al. (2018)
label an edge as polarized if at least one tweet
contained in the edge was manually annotated as
pro-Russian or pro-Ukrainian. While the network
14Golovchenko et al. (2018) use the k10 core of the net-
work, which is the maximal subset of nodes and edges, such
that all included nodes are connected to at least k other nodes
(Seidman, 1983), i.e. all users in the network have interacted
with at least 10 other users.
Figure 2: The left plot shows the original k10 retweet network as computed by Golovchenko et al. (2018) together
with the new edges that were added after manually re-annotating the classifier predictions. The right plot only
visualizes the new edges that we could add by filtering the classifier predictions. Pro-Russian edges are colored
in red, pro-Ukrainian edges are colored in dark blue and neutral edges are colored in grey. Both plots were made
using The Force Atlas 2 layout in gephi (Bastian et al., 2009).
shows a clear polarization, only a small subset of
the edges present in the network are labeled (see
Table 5).
Automatic polarity prediction of tweets can
help the analysis in two ways. Either, we can label
a previously unlabeled edge, or we can verify/con-
firm the manual labeling of an edge, by labeling
additional tweets that are comprised in the edge.
9.1 Predicting Polarized Edges
In order to get high precision predictions for un-
labeled tweets, we choose the probability thresh-
olds for predicting a pro-Russian or pro-Ukrainian
tweet such that the classifier would achieve 80%
precision on the test splits (recall at this precision
level is 23%). Table 5 shows the amount of polar-
ized edges we can predict at this precision level.
Upon manual inspection, we however find that
the quality of predictions is lower than estimated.
Hence, we manually re-annotate the pro-Russian
and pro-Ukrainian predictions according to the of-
ficial annotation guidelines used by (Golovchenko
et al., 2018). This way, we can label 77 new pro-
Russian edges by looking at 415 tweets, which
means that 19% of the candidates are hits. For
the pro-Ukrainian class, we can label 110 new
edges by looking at 611 tweets (18% hits). Hence
even though the quality of the classifier predic-
tions is too low to be integrated into the network
analysis right away, the classifier drastically facil-
itates the annotation process for human annotators
compared to annotating unfiltered tweets (from the
original labels we infer that for unfiltered tweets,
only 6% are hits for the pro-Russian class, and
11% for the pro-Ukrainian class).
Pro-R Pro-U Neutral Total
# labeled edges in k10 270 678 2193 3141
# candidate edges 349 488 - 873
# added after filtering
predictions
77 110 - 187
Table 5: Number of labeled edges in the k10 network
before and after augmentation with predicted labels.
Candidates are previously unlabeled edges for which
the model makes a confident prediction. The total num-
ber of edges in the network is 24,602.
10 Conclusion
In this work, we investigated the usefulness of text
classifiers to detect pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian
framing in tweets related to the MH17 crash, and
to which extent classifier predictions can be relied
on for producing high quality annotations. From
our classification experiments, we conclude that
the real-world applicability of text classifiers for
labeling polarized tweets in a retweet network is
restricted to pre-filtering tweets for manual anno-
tation. However, if used as a filter, the classifier
can significantly speed up the annotation process,
making large-scale content analysis more feasible.
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